Public Cost

Amazon's 238-city RFP (Sept 2017–Nov 2018) and 20-finalist competition documents are the strongest counter-signal in this dataset — Virginia submitted a formal VEDP proposal. However: Amazon did not publish an independent but-for analysis. Northern Virginia's pre-existing competitive advantage (fiber density, Reagan National proximity, government contracting ecosystem, WMATA grid) raises legitimate questions about whether the $550M in grants affected the outcome. Virginia did not commission an independent necessity analysis. HRS Tier 1: infrastructure planning (WMATA proximity, Pentagon City grid) predated the RFP. Competition evidence provides meaningful counter-signal; confidence rated Medium per HRS protocol (not Low). PDT-NQS v1.4.

VEDP retained professional economic development staff; Virginia's Secretary of Commerce coordinated the state response. No independent third-party leverage assessment was publicly released, but VEDP's professional infrastructure constitutes a partial advisory function — stronger than Foxconn (Case 1) where no advisory function existed. Northern Virginia's leverage was real (unique fiber infrastructure, Pentagon City grid, Dulles corridor, government contracting ecosystem) but was not formally documented in a public leverage analysis.

Full cost accounting was publicly available before the General Assembly vote. Performance grant structure: $22,000 per qualifying job × 25,000 jobs = $550M over 12 years from a dedicated fund authorized by HB 7002. Infrastructure investment ($195M, primarily WMATA/transit improvements) separately itemized. Arlington County community benefit fund ($34.4M) included in public documents. Virginia General Assembly fiscal impact analysis publicly available. Cost structure was transparent and performance-contingent.

Commitments were specific, wage-floored, time-bound, and performance-contingent: 25,000 jobs (expanding to 37,850 over additional phases) at average annual compensation ≥$150,000; $2.5B capital investment; $20M community investment fund; $14.4M affordable housing fund; Virginia Tech Innovation Campus commitment ($1B from state). The performance-grant structure ties disbursement directly to job creation — the return terms are the enforcement mechanism for F5 as well.

Performance grants disbursed only upon VEDP-verified annual job creation. Grant disbursement contingent on maintaining employment levels — failure to maintain triggers reduction or clawback. VEDP is the enforcement body with established track record. Annual reporting required. Total cap on disbursements enforced by the performance-contingent structure — unlike Foxconn where WEDC was both negotiating party and enforcement body, VEDP has independent enforcement standing.

Amazon publicly named November 13, 2018. General Assembly formal vote February 2019 — approximately 90 days after public announcement. BEI 30-day threshold met before the binding legislative vote. Partial because: (1) During the 14-month competition period, Virginia used 'Project Clancy' as the working code name for Amazon in state working documents — the company was known to officials but not the public. (2) Amazon's legal entity in documents is 'Amazon Data Services Virginia, LLC'; Amazon's corporate identity was clear. Notice timing threshold met; competition-period code-naming is the partial element.

Governor Walker cited Michigan competition at July 26, 2017 announcement. No independent but-for analysis commissioned. Wisconsin LAB Report 19-27 documented that WEDC did not conduct a rigorous independent analysis of project necessity. Competing bid documentation was asserted publicly but not entered as formal independent record. HRS confidence capped at Medium per HRS protocol.

No public record of Wisconsin or Racine County retaining independent advisors before or during negotiations. WEDC was the primary negotiating body. LAB Report 19-27 found WEDC did not benchmark the deal against comparable transactions. Wisconsin's real leverage (Great Lakes water access, ATC grid capacity, I-94 corridor) was not formally assessed in documents entered into the public record.

Wisconsin LFB estimated ~$3B in tax credits in August 2017 fiscal analysis — produced for the legislative vote, not disclosed in advance of it. Full cost across all affected taxing bodies (school districts, fire, county) was not consolidated in any pre-vote public document. WEDC published detailed credit schedules after agreement was signed (November 2017). F3 timing gap: Phase B Gap 1 (PDT-NQS v1.4 resolved: "before earliest binding formal action" = August 3, 2017 legislative signing).

WEDC agreement: 13,000 jobs at average wage ≥$53,875, plus $10B capital investment. Commitments were specific, wage-floored, and time-bound in the signed WEDC agreement. Agreement included flexibility provisions allowing the job commitment to be revised by mutual agreement. By 2019, Foxconn reduced job commitment targets multiple times without formal public notice. Score reflects terms at time of approval per PDT-NQS v1.4 (Gap 2 resolution: Amendment Flag mechanism for post-approval revision tracking).

WEDC agreement included clawback provisions tied to employment thresholds; credits were disbursed only if targets were met. Annual WEDC reporting was required. LAB Report 19-27 documented that WEDC served as both the negotiating party and the enforcement body (conflict of interest) and found audit rights were limited in practice. No independent third-party audit mechanism was identified in the agreement.

Foxconn Technology Group publicly named from July 26, 2017 announcement. Binding legislative vote occurred August 3, 2017 — approximately 8 days after announcement (well under BEI 30-day threshold). Key financial terms disclosed at announcement; full WEDC agreement was not publicly available before the legislative vote (signed November 2017).